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Abstract. Group signature is a fundamental cryptographic primitive,
aiming to protect anonymity and ensure accountability of users. It allows
group members to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the whole
group, while incorporating a tracing mechanism to identify the signer of
any suspected signature. Most of the existing group signature schemes,
however, do not guarantee security once secret keys are exposed. To
reduce potential damages caused by key exposure attacks, Song (ACM-
CCS 2001) put forward the concept of forward-secure group signature
(FSGS), which prevents attackers from forging group signatures pertain-
ing to past time periods even if a secret group signing key is revealed
at the current time period. For the time being, however, all known se-
cure FSGS schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions, and are
vulnerable against quantum computers.
In this work, we construct the first lattice-based FSGS scheme. Our
scheme is proven secure under the Short Integer Solution and Learning
With Errors assumptions. At the heart of our construction is a scalable
lattice-based key evolving mechanism, allowing users to periodically up-
date their secret keys and to efficiently prove in zero-knowledge that
key evolution process is done correctly. To realize this essential building
block, we first employ the Bonsai tree structure by Cash et al. (EURO-
CRYPT 2010) to handle the key evolution process, and then develop
Langlois et al.’s construction (PKC 2014) to design its supporting zero-
knowledge protocol.
Keywords. Group signatures, key exposure, forward-security, lattice-
based cryptography, zero-knowledge proofs
1 Introduction
Group signatures. Initially suggested by Chaum and van Heyst [20], group
signature (GS) allows users of a group controlled by a manager to sign mes-
sages anonymously in the name of the group (anonymity). Nevertheless, there
is a tracing manager to identify the signer of any signature should the user
abuse the anonymity (traceability). These seemingly contractive features, how-
ever, allow group signatures to find applications in various real-life scenarios such
as e-commence systems and anonymous online communications. Unfortunately,
the exposure of group signing keys renders almost all the existing schemes un-
satisfactory in practice. Indeed, in the traditional models of group signatures,
e.g., [6,30,10,8,31,56], the security of the scheme is no longer guaranteed when
the key exposure arises. So now let us look closely at the key exposure problem
and the countermeasures to it.
Exposure of Group Signing Keys and Forward-Secure Group Signa-
tures. Exposure of users’ secret keys is one of the greatest dangers to many cryp-
tographic protocols in practice [57]. Forward-secure mechanisms first introduced
by Anderson [4], aim to minimize the damages caused by secret key exposures.
More precisely, forward-security protects past uses of private keys in earlier time
periods even if a break-in occurs currently. Afterwards, many forward-secure
schemes were constructed, such as forward-secure signatures [7,1,27], forward-
secure public key encryption systems [23,17,9], and forward-secure signatures
with un-trusted update [13,41,42]. At the heart of these schemes is a key evolv-
ing technique that operates as follows. It divides the lifetime of the scheme into
discrete T time periods. Upon entering a new time period, a subsequent secret
key is computed from the current one via a one-way key evolution algorithm.
Meanwhile, the current key is deleted promptly. Due to the one-wayness of the
updating algorithm, the security of the previous keys is preserved even though
the current one is compromised. Therefore, by carefully choosing a secure scheme
that operates well with a key evolving mechanism, forward-security of the scheme
can be guaranteed.
As investigated by Song [57], secret key exposure in group signatures is much
more damaging than in ordinary digital signatures. In group signatures, if one
group member’s signing key is disclosed to the attacker, then the latter can sign
arbitrary messages. In this situation, if the underlying group signature scheme
is not secure against exposure of group signing keys, then the whole system
has to be re-initialized, which is obviously inefficient in practice. Besides its
inefficiency, this solution is also unsatisfactory. Once there is a break-in of the
system, all previously signed group signatures become invalid since we do not
have a mechanism to distinguish whether a signature is generated by a legitimate
group member or by the attacker. What is worse, one of the easiest way for a
misbehaving member Eve to attack the system and/or to repudiate her illegally
signed signatures is to reveal her group signing key secretly in the Internet and
then claim to be a victim of the key exposure problem [27]. Now the users who
had accepted signatures before Eve’s group signing key is exposed are now at
the mercy of all the group members, some of whom (e.g., Eve) would not reissue
the signatures with the new key.
The aforementioned problems induced by the exposure of group signing keys
motivated Song [57] to put forward the notion of forward-secure group signature
(FSGS), in which group members are able to update their group signing keys at
each time period via a one-way key evolution algorithm. Therefore, when some
group member’s singing key is disclosed, all the signatures generated during past
periods remain valid, which then prevents dishonest group members from repu-
diating signatures by simply exposing keys. Later, Nakanishi, Hira, Funabiki [51]
defined a rigourous security model of FSGS for static groups, where users are
fixed throughout the scheme, and demonstrated a pairing-based construction.
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Subsequently, Libert and Yung [43] extended Nakanishi et al.’s work to cap-
ture the setting of the dynamically growing groups. However, all these schemes
are constructions based on number-theoretic assumptions and are fragile in the
presence of quantum adversaries. In order not to put all eggs in one basket, it is
imperative to consider instantiations based on alternative, post-quantum foun-
dations, e.g., lattice assumptions. In view of this, let us now look at the topic of
lattice-based group signatures.
Lattice-based group signatures. In 2010, Gordon et al. [26] introduced the
first lattice-based instantiation of GS. Since then, numerous schemes have been
put forward with various improvements on security, efficiency, and functional-
ity. While many of them [16,32,45,53,37,11,22] aim to provide enhancement on
security and efficiency, they are solely designed for the static groups and often
fall too short for specific needs of real-life applications. With regard to advanced
features, there have been proposed several schemes [33,34,46,48,40,47] and they
are still behind their counterparts in the number-theoretic setting. Specifically,
[33,34,46,48] deal with dynamic user enrollments and/or revocations of misbe-
having users while [40,47] attempt to restrict the power of the tracing manager
or keep his actions accountable. For the time being, the problem of making GS
secure against the key exposure problem is still open in the context of lattices.
Taking into account the great threat of key exposure to GS and the vulnerabil-
ity of GS from number-theoretic assumptions in front of quantum computers, it
would be tempting to investigate lattice-based instantiations of FSGS. Further-
more, it would be desirable to achieve it with reasonable overhead, e.g., with
complexity at most poly-logarithmic in T .
Our Contributions. We introduce the first FSGS scheme in the context of
lattices. The scheme satisfies the security requirements put forward by Nakan-
ishi et al. [51] in the random oracle model. Assuming the hardness of the Short
Integer Solution (SIS) problem and the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem,
our scheme achieves full anonymity and a stronger notion of traceability named
forward-secure traceability, which captures the traceability in the setting of key
exposure problems. Let λ be the security parameter, N be the expected num-
ber of group members, and T be total time periods, our construction achieves
signature size O˜(λ(logN + logT )), group public key size O˜(λ2(logN + logT )),
and secret key size O˜(λ2(logN + logT )2 logT ). In particular, forward security
is achieved with a reasonable cost: the size of keys and signatures are at most
O(log3 T ) larger than those of the basic GS scheme [33] upon which we build
ours.
Overview of Our Techniques. Typically, designing secure GS requires a
combination of digital signature, encryption scheme and zero-knowledge (ZK)
protocol. Let us first consider an ordinary GS scheme similar to the template
proposed by Bellare et al. [6]. In the scheme, each user is assigned an ℓ bit
string id as identity, where ℓ = logN . The user’s signing key is a signature
on his identifier id, generated by the group manager. Specifically, we let the
signing key be a short vector vid satisfying Aid · vid = u mod q for some public
vector u. When signing a message, the user first encrypts his identity id to a
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ciphertext c and proves that he possesses a valid signature on his identity that
is also correctly encrypted to c. To achieve forward-security, we would need a
mechanism to update the group signing key periodically and a ZK protocol to
prove that the key updating procedure is done honestly.
Inspired by the HIBE-like key evolving technique from Nakanishi et al. [51]
and Libert and Yung [43], which in turn follows from [17,9,13], we exploit the
hierarchical structure of the Bonsai tree [19] to enable periodical key updating.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only lattice-based HIBE in the stan-
dard model with supporting (Stern-like [58]) ZK proofs by Langlois et al. [33],
which seems to be the right stepping stone towards our goal. Let T = 2d be
the total number of time periods. To enable key updating, each user id is as-
sociated with a subtree of depth d, where the leaves of the tree correspond to
successive time periods in the apparent way. Let the subtree be identified by
matrices Aid,A
0
ℓ+1,A
1
ℓ+1, . . . ,A
0
ℓ+d,A
1
ℓ+d and z = Bin(t) be the binary repre-
sentation of t. In order to show the key evolution is done correctly, we observe
that it suffices to prove possession of a (short) Bonsai signature vid‖z satisfy-
ing [Aid|Az[1]ℓ+1| · · · |Az[d]ℓ+d] · vid‖z = u mod q. However, proving knowledge of the
Bonsai signature departs from the protocol presented in [33]. The matrix Aid
should be secret and the binary string z should be public in our case while it is
the other way around in [33]. Nevertheless, analyzing the above equation care-
fully, it actually reduces to proving knowledge of short vectors w1 and w2 and a
binary string id such that Aid ·w1 +A′′ ·w2 = u mod q, where vid‖z = (w1‖w2)
and A′′ is built from some public matrices. To prove knowledge of w2, we can
employ the decomposition/extension/permutation techniques by Ling et al. [44]
that operate in Stern’s framework [58]. Regarding the ZK protocol for proving
knowledge of w1 and id, it indeed depends on the signature scheme used by the
group manager to certify users. For simplicity, we employ the Bonsai tree signa-
ture [19] as well. Then, by utilizing the ZK protocol in [33], we are able to prove
knowledge of w1 and id and manage to obtain the desired ZK protocol for prov-
ing possession of vid‖z. It is worth mentioning that, besides the Bonsai signature,
the Boyen signature [12] is also a plausible candidate, for which a ZK protocol
showing the possession of a valid message-signature pair was known [45].
In the above, we have discussed the (Stern-like) ZK protocol showing knowl-
edge of correctly updated signing key vid‖Bin(t), the main technical building
block in achieving our FSGS scheme. The next question is then how should
the user derive vid‖Bin(t) for all possible t using his group signing key vid. To
this end, we make a minor but significant change to the group signing key. Ob-
serve that for the Bonsai tree signature, once a trapdoor matrix Sid satisfying
Aid · Sid = 0 mod q is known, the user id is able to generate vid‖Bin(t) for all
possible t. Therefore, we let the user’s signing key be Sid instead. Nevertheless,
we then observe user id should not hold Sid at all times, as the adversary could
also generate all possible vid‖Bin(t) once Sid is known to him. One trivial method
is to generate all possible vid‖Bin(t) and then delete all the previous ones upon
entering a new period. However, this will incur linear dependency on T , which
is undesirable for efficiency purpose.
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To achieve logarithmic overhead, we should think of a way to employ the
structure of the Bonsai tree. Let Nodes(t→T−1) be the set of nodes such that
it has size at most log T and contains exactly one ancestor of each leaf or the
leaf itself between t and T − 11. Now we let the signing key of user id at time
t be trapdoor matrices Sid‖z for all z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1). The user is then able to
produce all possible vid‖Bin(t) by employing Sid‖z if z is an ancestor of Bin(t).
More importantly, for each z′ ∈ Nodes(t+1→T−1), there exists a unique ancestor
z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1), which enables the evolving of the signing key from time t to
t+ 1, thanks to the basis delegation algorithm of the Bonsai signature.
As discussed so far, we have shown how to update the key periodically and
identified the ZK protocol for the honest behaviour of update. The thing that
remains is to find a public key encryption (PKE) scheme that is compatible
with the above ingredients. Furthermore, to achieve full anonymity, it typically
requires the PKE scheme to be CCA-secure. To this end, we apply the CHK
transform [18] to the identity-based encryption scheme [25]. For the obtained
PKE scheme, we observe that there exists a Stern-like ZK protocol (see [45]) for
proving knowledge of the plaintext, which is compatible in our setting.
To summarize, we have obtained a lattice-based FSGS scheme by developing
several technical building blocks from previous works in a non-trivial way. Our
scheme satisfies full anonymity due to the facts that the underlying encryption
scheme is CCA-secure and that the underlying ZK protocol is statistically zero-
knowledge, and achieves forward-secure traceability due to the security of the
Bonsai tree signature [19]. We believe that, our construction - while not being
truly novel - would certainly help to enrich the area of lattice-based GS.
Related Work. Recently, Kansal, Dutta and Mukhopadhyay [28] proposed a
lattice-based FSGS scheme that operates in the model of Libert and Yung [43].
Unfortunately, it can be observed that their construction does not satisfy the
correctness and security requirements of [43]. (For details, see Appendix A.)
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, all vectors are column vectors. When concatenating two
matrices of formA ∈ Rn×m andB ∈ Rn×k, we use the notion [A|B] ∈ Rn×(m+k)
while we denote (x‖y) ∈ Rm+k as the concatenation of two vectors of form
x ∈ Rm and y ∈ Rk. Let [m] be the set {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
2.1 Forward-Secure Group Signatures
We now recall the syntax and security requirements of forward-secure group sig-
nature (FSGS), as formalized by Nakanishi et al. [51]. An FSGS scheme consists
of the following polynomial-time algorithms.
1 This set can be determined by the Nodeselect algorithm presented by Libert and
Yung [43].
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KeyGen: This algorithm takes the tuple (λ, T,N) as input, with λ being security
parameter, T being total number of time periods, and N being maximum
number of group members. It then returns group public key gpk, secret key
msk of group manager (GM), secret key mosk of tracing manager (TM),
initial user secret keys usk0. usk0 is an array of initial N secret signing
key {usk0[0],usk0[1], · · · ,usk0[N − 1]}, with usk0[i] being the initial key
of user i.
KeyUpdate: On inputs gpk, uskt[i], i, and t+ 1, with uskt[i] being the secret
signing key of user i at time t, this randomized algorithm outputs the secret
signing key uskt+1[i] of user i at time t+ 1.
Sign: On inputs gpk, uskt[i], user i, time period t, and message M , this ran-
domized algorithm generates a signature Σ on message M .
Verify: It takes as inputs gpk, time period t, message M and signature Σ, and
returns 1/0 indicating the validity of the signature.
Open: On inputs gpk, mosk, t, M and Σ, this deterministic algorithm returns
an index i or ⊥.
Correctness. For all λ, T,N , (gpk,msk,mosk,usk0) ← KeyGen(λ, T,N), ∀i ∈
{0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, all M ∈ {0, 1}∗, all uskt[i] ← KeyUpdate(gpk,uskt−1[i], i, t)
for all t ∈ {0, 1, · · ·T − 1}, the following equations hold:
Verify(gpk, t,M, Sign(gpk,uskt[i], t,M)) = 1,
Open(gpk,mosk, t,M, Sign(gpk,uskt[i], t,M)) = i.
Forward-Secure Traceability. This requirement demands that any PPT adver-
sary, even if it can corrupt the tracing manager and some (or all) group members,
is not able to produce a valid signature (i) that is opened to some non-corrupted
user or (ii) that is traced to some corrupted user, but the signature is signed at
time period preceding the secret key query of this corrupted user. Note that (i)
captures the standard traceability requirement as in [6] while (ii) deals with the
new requirement in the context of forward-security. Details are modelled in the
experiment in Fig. 1.
In the experiment in Fig. 1, the adversary can adaptively choose which user
to corrupt, when to corrupt and when to halt, and when to output its forgery.
Furthermore, it is allowed to query signature on any message of a member i
through the signing oracle Sign(uskt[·], ·) if i /∈ CU at time period t.
Define the advantage AdvTraceFSGS,A(λ, T,N) of adversary A against forward-
secure traceability of an FSGS scheme as Pr[ExpTraceFSGS,A(λ, T,N) = 1]. An FSGS
scheme is forward-secure traceable if the advantage of any PPT adversary is
negligible.
Full Anonymity. This requirement demands that any PPT adversary is infeasible
to figure out which of two signers of its choice signed the challenged message of its
choice at time period t of its choice. Details of this requirement is modelled in the
experiment in Fig. 2. In the experiment in Fig. 2, the adversary is accessible to
secret keys of all group users and GM, and can query the opening of any signature
except for the challenged one through the opening oracle Open(mosk, ·).
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Experiment ExpTraceFSGS,A(λ, T,N)
(gpk,msk,mosk,usk0)← KeyGen(λ,T,N),
st← (gpk,mosk), CU← ∅, t := 0, Cont = 1, stop = 0, K ← ǫ,
For(t = 0, t ≤ T − 1, t++)
While(Cont = 1)
(Cont, j, st)← ASign(uskt[·],·)(choose1, K, st),
if Cont = 1, let CU← CU ∪ {j}, K ← K ∪ {uskt[j], t}, endif
Endwhile
stop← A(choose2, st, t,K),
if stop = 1, break; else Cont = 1.
Endfor
(t∗,M∗, Σ∗)← A(guess, st, t,K),
Output 1 if
– Verify(gpk, t∗,M∗, Σ∗) = 1,
– Σ∗ is not obtained from querying the signing oracle by A, and
– Compute i∗ ← Open(gpk,mosk, t∗,M∗, Σ∗), then
• either i∗ /∈ CU,
• or i∗ ∈ CU, but A only queried uskt[i
∗] for t > t∗.
Fig. 1: Experiment used to define forward-secure traceability of an FSGS
scheme.
Define AdvAnonFSGS,A(λ, T,N) of A against full anonymity of an FSGS scheme
as Pr[ExpAnonFSGS,A(λ, T,N) = 1]. An FSGS scheme is fully anonymous if the
advantage of any PPT adversary A is negligible.
Experiment ExpAnonFSGS,A(λ, T,N)
(gpk,msk,mosk,usk0)← KeyGen(λ,T,N),
(st, t, i0, i1,M)← A
Open(mosk,·)(choose, gpk,msk,usk0),
b← {0, 1}, Σ ← Sign(gpk, uskt[ib], t,M),
b′ ← AOpen(mosk,·)(guess, st, Σ),
If b′ = b, then output 1,
Else output 0.
Fig. 2: Experiment used to define full anonymity of an FSGS scheme.
2.2 Some Background on Lattices
Let n ∈ Z+ and Λ be a lattice of dimension n over Rn. Let S = {s1, · · · , sn} ⊂
R
n be a basis of Λ. For simplicity, we write S = [s1| · · · |sn] ∈ Rn×n. Define
‖S‖ = Maxi‖si‖. Let S˜ = [˜s1| · · · |˜sn] be the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of
S. We refer to ‖S˜‖ as the Gram-Schmidt norm of S. For any c ∈ Rn and σ ∈ R+,
define the following: ρσ,c(x) = exp(−π ‖x−c‖
2
σ2
) and ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρσ,c(x) for
any x ∈ Λ. Define the discrete Gaussian distribution over the lattice Λ with
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parameter σ and center c to be DΛ,σ,c(x) = ρσ,c(x)/ρσ,c(Λ) for any x ∈ Λ. We
often omit c if it is 0.
Let n,m, q ∈ Z+ with q ≥ 2. For A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq that admits a
solution to the equation A · x = u mod q, define
Λ⊥(A) = {e ∈ Zm : Ae = 0 mod q}, Λu(A) = {e ∈ Zm : Ae = u mod q}.
Define discrete Gaussian distribution over the set Λu(A) in the following way:
DΛu(A),σ,c(x) = ρσ,c(x)/ρσ,c(Λ
u(A)) for x ∈ Λu(A).
Lemma 1 ([25,54]). Let n,m, q ∈ Z+ with q ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2n log q. Let σ ∈ R
such that σ ≥ ω(√logm).
– Then for all but a 2q−n fraction of all A ∈ Zn×mq , the distribution of the syn-
drome u = A ·e mod q is within negligible statistical distance from uniform
over Znq for e ←֓ DZm,σ. Besides, given A · e = u mod q, the conditional
distribution of e ←֓ DZm,σ is DΛu(A),σ.
– Let x ←֓ DZ,σ, t = logn, and β = ⌈σ · t⌉. Then the probability of |x| ≤ β is
overwhelming.
– The distribution DZm,σ has min-entropy at least m− 1.
We next present two hard average-case problems: the Short Integer Solution
(SIS) problem (in the ℓ∞ norm) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem.
Definition 1 ([2,50,25], SIS∞n,m,q,β). Given A
$←− Zn×mq , find a vector e ∈ Zm
so that A · e = 0 mod q and 0 < ‖e‖∞ ≤ β.
Let q > β
√
n be an integer and m,β be polynomials in n, then solving the
SIS∞n,m,q,β problem (in the ℓ∞ norm) is no easier than solving the SIVPγ problem
in the worst-case for some γ = β · O˜(√nm) (see [25,49]).
Definition 2 ([55], LWEn,q,χ). For s ∈ Znq , define a distribution As,χ over
Z
n
q × Zq as follows: it samples a uniform vector a over Znq and an element
e according to χ, and outputs the pair (a,a⊤ · s + e). Then the goal of the
LWEn,q,χ problem is to distinguish m = poly(n) samples chosen according to the
distribution As,χ for some secret s ∈ Znq from m samples chosen according to
the uniform distribution over Znq × Zq.
Let B = O˜(√n) and χ be an efficiently samplable distribution over Z that
outputs samples e ∈ Z with |e| ≤ B with all but negligible probability in n. If
q ≥ 2 is an arbitrary modulus, then the LWEn,q,χ problem is at least as hard as
the worst-case problem SIVPγ with γ = O˜(n ·q/B) through an efficient quantum
reduction [55,14]. Additionally, it is showed that the hardness of the LWE problem
is maintained when the secret s is chosen from the error distribution χ (see [5]).
Now let us recall some algorithms from previous works that will be used
extensively in this work.
Lemma 2 ([3]). Let n,m, q ∈ Z+ with q ≥ 2 and m = O(n log q). There is a
PPT algorithm TrapGen(n,m, q) which returns a tuple (A,S) such that
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– A is within negligible statistical distance from uniform over Zn×mq ,
– S is a basis for Λ⊥(A), i.e., A · S = 0 mod q, and ‖S˜‖ ≤ O(√n log q).
Lemma 3 ([25]). Let S ∈ Zm×m be a basis of Λ⊥(A) for some A ∈ Zn×mq
whose columns expand the entire group Znq . Let u be a vector over Z
n
q and s ≥
ω(
√
logn) · ‖S˜‖. There is a PPT algorithm SampleD(A,S,u, s) which returns a
vector v ∈ Λu(A) from a distribution that is within negligible statistical distance
from DΛu(A),s.
We also need the following two algorithms to securely delegate basis.
Lemma 4 ([19]). Let S ∈ Zm×m be a basis of Λ⊥(A) for some A ∈ Zn×mq
whose columns generate the entire group Znq . Let A
′ ∈ Zn×m′q be any matrix
containing A as a submatrix. There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
ExtBasis(S,A′) which returns a basis S′ ∈ Zm′×m′ of Λ⊥(A′) with ‖S˜′‖ = ‖S˜‖.
Lemma 5 ([19]). Let S be a basis of an m-dimensional integer lattice Λ and
a parameter s ≥ ω(√logn) · ‖S˜‖. There is a PPT algorithm RandBasis(S, s)
that outputs a new basis S′ of Λ with ‖S′‖ ≤ s · √m. Moreover, for any two
bases S0,S1 of Λ and any s ≥ max{‖S˜0‖, ‖S˜1‖} · ω(
√
logn), the outputs of
RandBasis(S0, s) and RandBasis(S1, s) are statistically close.
2.3 The Bonsai Tree Signature Scheme
Our construction builds on the Bonsai tree signature scheme [19]. Now we de-
scribe it briefly. The scheme takes the following parameters: λ is the security pa-
rameter and n = O(λ), ℓ is the message length, integer q = poly(n) is sufficiently
large,m = O(n log q), L˜ = O(√n log q), s = ω(√logn)·L˜, and β = ⌈s·logn⌉. The
verification key is the tuple (A0,A
0
1,A
1
1, . . . ,A
0
ℓ ,A
1
ℓ ,u) while the signing key is
S0, where (A0,S0) is generated by the TrapGen(n,m, q) algorithm as described
in Lemma 2 and matrices A01,A
1
1, . . . ,A
0
ℓ ,A
1
ℓ and vector u are all uniformly
random and independent over Zn×mq and Z
n
q , respectively.
To sign a binary message id ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, the signer first computes the ma-
trix Aid := [A0|Aid[1]1 | · · · |Aid[ℓ]ℓ ] ∈ Zn×(ℓ+1)mq , and then outputs a vector v ∈
Λu(Aid) via the algorithm SampleD(ExtBasis(S0,Aid),u, s). To verify the valid-
ity of v on message id, the verifier computesAid as above and checks ifAid·v = u
mod q and ‖v‖∞ ≤ β hold. They proved that this signature scheme is existential
unforgeable under static chosen message attacks based on the hardness of the
SIS problem.
2.4 Stern-Like Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems
The statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) presented in this
work are Stern-like [58] protocols. In 1996, Stern [58] suggested a three-move
zero-knowledge protocol for the well-known syndrome decoding (SD) problem.
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It was then later adapted to the lattice setting for a restricted version of Inho-
mogeneous Short Integer Solution (ISIS∞) problem by Kawachi et al. [29]. More
recently, Ling et al. [44] generalized the protocol to handle more versatile rela-
tions that find applications in the designs of various lattice-based constructions
(see, e.g., [37,35,52,38,36,39]). Libert et al. [34] put forward an abstraction of
Stern’s protocol to capture a wider range of lattice-based relations, which we
now recall.
An abstraction of Stern’s Protocol. Let K,L, q ∈ Z+ with L ≥ K and
q ≥ 2, and let VALID ⊂ {−1, 0, 1}L. Given a finite set S, associate every φ ∈ S
with a permutation Γφ of L elements so that the following conditions hold:{
w ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Γφ(w) ∈ VALID,
If w ∈ VALID and φ is uniform in S, then Γφ(w) is uniform in VALID.
(1)
The target is to construct a statistical ZKAoK for the abstract relation of the
following form:
Rabstract =
{
(M,u),w ∈ ZK×Lq × ZKq × VALID :M ·w = u mod q.
}
To obtain the desired ZKAoK protocol, one has to prove that w ∈ VALID and
w satisfies the linear equation M ·w = u mod q. To prove the former condition
holds in a ZK manner, the prover chooses φ
$←− S and let the verifier check
Γφ(w) ∈ VALID. According to the first condition in (1), the verifier should be
convinced that w is indeed from the set VALID. At the same time, the verifier
is not able to learn any extra information about w due to the second condition
in (1). To show in ZK that the linear equation holds, the prover simply chooses
rw
$←− ZLq as a masking vector and then shows to the verifier that the equation
M · (w+ rw) =M · rw + u mod q holds instead.
Figure 3 describes the interaction between the prover P and the verifier V in
details. The system utilizes a statistically hiding and computationally binding
string commitment scheme COM from [29].
Theorem 1 ([34]). Let COM be a statistically hiding and computationally bind-
ing string commitment scheme. Then the interactive depicted in Figure 3 is a
statistical ZKAoK with perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and commu-
nication cost O(L log q). Specifically:
– There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M,u), with proba-
bility 2/3 it outputs an accepted transcript that is within negligible statistical
distance from the one produced by an honest prover who knows the witness.
– There is an algorithm that, takes as inputs (M,u) and three accepting tran-
scripts (CMT, 1,RSP1), (CMT, 2,RSP2), (CMT, 3,RSP3) on (M,u), and
outputs w′ ∈ VALID such that M ·w′ = u mod q in polynomial time.
The proof of the Theorem 1, appeared in [34], is omitted here.
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1. Commitment: Prover chooses rw
$
←− ZLq , φ
$
←− S and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for
COM. Then he sends CMT =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
to the verifier, where
C1 = COM(φ,M · rw mod q; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γφ(rw); ρ2),
C3 = COM(Γφ(w+ rw mod q); ρ3).
2. Challenge: V randomly choose a challenge Ch from the set {1, 2, 3} and sends it
to P .
3. Response: According to the choice of Ch, P sends back response RSP computed
in the following manner:
– Ch = 1: Let tw = Γφ(w), tr = Γφ(rw), and RSP = (tw, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Let φ2 = φ, w2 = w+ rw mod q, and RSP = (φ2,w2, ρ1, ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Let φ3 = φ, w3 = rw , and RSP = (φ3,w3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: When receiving RSP from P , V performs as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that tw ∈ VALID, C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tw+tr mod q; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(φ2,M·w2−u mod q; ρ1), C3 = COM(Γφ2(w2); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(φ3,M ·w3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γφ3(w3); ρ2).
In each case, V returns 1 if and only if all the conditions hold.
Fig. 3: Stern-like ZKAoK for the relation Rabstract.
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3 Our Lattice-Based Forward-Secure Group Signature
In the description below, for a binary tree of depth k, we identify each node
at depth j with a binary vector z of length j such that z[1] to z[j] are ordered
from the top to the bottom and a 0 and a 1 indicate the left and right branch
respectively in the order of traversal. Let B ∈ Z+. For an integer 0 ≤ b ≤ B,
denote Bin(b) as the binary representation of b with length ⌈logB⌉.
In our FSGS scheme, lifetime of the scheme is divided into T discrete periods
0, 1, · · · , T − 1. For simplicity, let T = 2d for some d ∈ Z+. Following previous
works [13,43], each time period t is associated with leaf Bin(t).
Following [13], for j = 1, · · · , d + 1, t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1}, we define a time
period’s “right sibling at depth j” as
sibling(j, t) =

(1)⊤ if j = 1 and Bin(t)[j] = 0,
(Bin(t)[1], · · · ,Bin(t)[j − 1], 1)⊤ if 1 < j ≤ d and Bin(t)[j] = 0,
⊥ if j ≤ d and Bin(t)[j] = 1,
Bin(t) if j = d+ 1.
Define node set Nodes(t→T−1) to be {sibling(1, t), · · · , sibling(d+1, t)}. For any
t′ > t, one can check that for any non-⊥ z′ ∈ Nodes(t′→T−1), there exists a
z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1) such that z is an ancestor of z′.
ǫ
000 111011 100010 101001 110
t = 0 t = 7t = 3 t = 4t = 2 t = 5t = 1 t = 6
00 1101 10
0 1
Fig. 4: A binary tree with time periods T = 23. Consider the path from the
root ǫ to the leaf node (010)⊤, we have sibling(1, 2) = (1)⊤, sibling(2, 2) = ⊥,
sibling(3, 2) = (011)⊤, and sibling(4, 2) = (010)⊤. Therefore, Nodes(2→7) =
{(1)⊤,⊥, (011)⊤, (010)⊤}. Similarly, Nodes(5→7) = {⊥, (11)⊤,⊥, (101)⊤}. It is
verifiable that node (1)⊤ is an ancestor of both node (101)⊤ and node (11)⊤.
3.1 Description of the Scheme
Our scheme operates in the Nakanishi et al.’s (static) model [51]. Let T = 2d
and N = 2ℓ. The group public key consists of (i) a Bonsai tree of depth ℓ + d
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specified by a matrix A = [A0|A01|A11 · · · |A0ℓ+d|A1ℓ+d] ∈ Zn×(2ℓ+2d+1)mq and a
vector u ∈ Znq , which are for issuing certificate; (ii) A public matrix B ∈ Zn×mq
of the IBE scheme by Gentry et al. [25], which is for encrypting user identities
when signing messages. The secret key of GM is a trapdoor matrix of the Bonsai
tree while the secret key of the tracing manager is a trapdoor matrix of the IBE
scheme.
Each user id ∈ {0, 1}ℓ is assigned a node id. To enable periodical key updat-
ing, each user id is associated with a subtree of depth d. In our scheme, all users
are assumed to be valid group members from time 0 to T − 1. Let z be a binary
string of length dz ≤ d. Define Aid‖z = [A0|Aid[1]1 | · · · |Aid[ℓ]ℓ |Az[1]ℓ+1| · · · |Az[dz]ℓ+dz ] ∈
Z
n×(ℓ+dz+1)m
q . Specifically, the group signing key of user id at time t is {Sid‖z, z ∈
Nodes(t→T−1)}, which satisfies Aid‖z ·Sid‖z = 0 mod q. Thanks to the basis del-
egation technique [19], users are able to compute the trapdoor matrices for all
the descendent of nodes in the set Nodes(t→T−1) and hence are able to derive
all the subsequent signing keys.We remark that for leaf nodes, it is sufficient to
generate short vectors instead of short bases, since we do not need to perform
further delegations.
Once received the group signing key, each user can issue signatures on be-
half of the group. When signing a message at time t, user id first generates a
one-time signature key pair (ovk, osk), and then encrypts his identity id to a ci-
phertext c using the IBE scheme with respect to “identity” ovk. Next, he proves
in zero-knowledge that: (i) he is a certified group member; (ii) he has done key
evolution honestly; (iii) c is a correct encryption of id. To prove that facts (i)
and (ii) hold, it is sufficient to prove knowledge of a short vector vid‖Bin(t) such
that Aid‖Bin(t) · vid‖Bin(t) = u mod q. The protocol is developed from Langlois et
al.’s technique [33](which was also employed in [21] for designing policy-based
signatures) and Ling et al.’s technique [44], and is repeated κ = ω(logn) times to
achieve negligible soundness error, and is made non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir
transform [24] as a triple Π . Finally, the user generates a one-time signature sig
on the pair (c, Π), and outputs the group signature consisting of (ovk, c, Π, sig).
To verify a group signature, one checks the validity of sig under the key ovk
and Π . In case of dispute, TM can decrypt the ciphertext with respect to the
“identity” ovk using his secret key. Details of the scheme are described below.
KeyGen(λ, T,N): On inputs security parameter λ, total number of time periods
T = 2d for some d ∈ Z+ and maximum number of group members N = 2ℓ
for some ℓ ∈ Z+, this algorithm does the following:
1. Choose n = O(λ), q = poly(n), m = O(n log q). Let k = ℓ + d and
κ = ω(logn).
2. Run TrapGen(n,m, q) as described in Lemma 2 to obtain A0 ∈ Zn×mq
and S0 ∈ Zm×m.
3. Sample u
$←− Znq , and Abi $←− Zn×mq for all i ∈ [k] and b ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Choose a one-time signature scheme OT S = (OGen,OSign,OVer), and
a statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment scheme
COM from [29] that will be used in our zero-knowledge argument system.
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5. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×ℓq and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ be collision-
resistant hash functions, which will be modelled as random oracles in
the security analysis.
6. Let Gaussian parameter si be O(
√
nk log q)i−ℓ+1 ·ω(√logn)i−ℓ+1, which
will be used to generate short bases or sample short vectors at level i for
i ∈ {ℓ, ℓ+ 1, · · · , k}.
7. Choose integer bounds β = ⌈sk · logn⌉, B = O˜(
√
n), and let χ be a
B-bounded distribution over Z.
8. Generate a master key pair (B,S) ∈ Zn×mq ×Zm×m for the IBE scheme
by Gentry et al. [25] via the TrapGen(n,m, q) algorithm.
9. For user i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, let id = Bin(i) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. Let node id be
the identifier of user i. Determine the node set Nodes(0→T−1).
For z ∈ Nodes(0→T−1), if z = ⊥, set usk0[i][z] = ⊥. Otherwise denote
dz as the length of z with dz ≤ d, compute the matrix
Aid‖z = [A0|Aid[1]1 | · · · |Aid[ℓ]ℓ |Az[1]ℓ+1| · · · |Az[dz]ℓ+dz ] ∈ Zn×(ℓ+dz+1)mq .
and proceed as follows:
– If z is of length d, i.e., dz = d, it computes a vector vid‖z ∈ Λu(Aid‖z)
via
vid‖z ← SampleD(ExtBasis(S0,Aid‖z),u, sk).
Set usk0[i][z] = vid‖z.
– If z is of length less than d, i.e., 1 ≤ dz < d, it computes a matrix
Sid‖z ∈ Z(ℓ+dz+1)m×(ℓ+dz+1)m via
Sid‖z ← RandBasis(ExtBasis(S0,Aid‖z), sℓ+dz).
Set usk0[i][z] = Sid‖z.
Let usk0[i] = {usk0[i][z], z ∈ Nodes(0→T−1)} be the initial secret key of
user i.
Let public parameter be pp, group public key be gpk, secret key of GM be
msk, secret key of TM be mosk and initial secret key be usk0, which are
defined as follows:
pp = {n, q,m, ℓ, d, k, κ,OT S,COM,H0,H1, sℓ, . . . , sk, β, B},
gpk = {pp,A0,A01,A11, . . . ,A0k,A1k,u,B},
msk = S0, mosk = S,
usk0 = {usk0[0], usk0[1], . . . , usk0[N − 1]}.
KeyUpdate(gpk,uskt[i], i, t+1): Compute the identifier of user i as id = Bin(i),
parse uskt[i] = {uskt[i][z], z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1)}, and determine the node set
Nodes(t+1→T−1).
For z′ ∈ Nodes(t+1→T−1), if z′ = ⊥, set uskt+1[i][z′] = ⊥. Otherwise, there
exists exactly one z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1) as its prefix, i.e., z′ = z‖y for some
suffix y. Consider the following two cases.
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1. If z′ = z, let uskt+1[i][z
′] = uskt[i][z].
2. If z′ = z‖y for some non-empty y, then uskt[i][z] = Sid‖z . Consider the
following two subcases.
– If z′ is of length d, run
vid‖z′ ← SampleD(ExtBasis(Sid‖z ,Aid‖z′),u, sk),
and set uskt+1[i][z
′] = vid‖z′ .
– If z′ is of length less than d, run
Sid‖z′ ← RandBasis(ExtBasis(Sid‖z ,Aid‖z′), sℓ+dz′ ),
and set uskt+1[i][z
′] = Sid‖z′ .
Output updated key as uskt+1[i] = {uskt+1[i][z′], z′ ∈ Nodes(t+1→T−1)}.
Sign(gpk,uskt[i], i, t,M): Compute the identifier id = Bin(i). By the structure
of the node set Nodes(t→T−1), there exists some z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1) such that
z = Bin(t) is of length d and uskt[i][z] = vid‖z.
To sign a messageM ∈ {0, 1}∗, the signer then performs the following steps.
1. First, generate a one-time signature key pair (ovk, osk)← OGen(n), and
then encrypt id with respect to “identity” ovk as follows. Let G =
H0(ovk) ∈ Zn×ℓq . Sample s ←֓ χn, e1 ←֓ χm, e2 ←֓ χℓ, and compute
ciphertext (c1, c2) ∈ Zmq × Zℓq as
(c1 = B
⊤ · s+ e1, c2 =G⊤ · s+ e2 + ⌊ q
2
⌋ · id). (2)
2. Second, compute the matrixAid‖z and generate a NIZKAoK Π to demon-
strate the possession of a valid tuple
ξ = (id, s, e1, e2,vid‖z) (3)
such that
(a) Aid‖z · vid‖z = u mod q, and ‖vid‖z‖∞ ≤ β.
(b) Equations in (2) hold with ‖s‖∞ ≤ B, ‖e1‖∞ ≤ B and ‖e2‖∞ ≤ B.
This is done by running our argument system described in Section 4.2
with public input
γ = (A0,A
0
1,A
1
1, . . . ,A
0
k,A
1
k,u,B,G, c1, c2, t)
and witness tuple ξ as above. The protocol is repeated κ = ω(logn) times
to obtain negligible soundness error and made non-interactive via the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [24] as a triple Π = ((CMTi)
κ
i=1,CH, (RSPi)
κ
i=1)
with CH = H1(M, (CMTi)κi=1, c1, c2, t).
3. Third, compute a one-time signature sig = OSign(osk; c1, c2, Π) and
output the signature as Σ = (ovk, c1, c2, Π, sig).
Verify(gpk, t,M,Σ): This algorithm proceeds as follows:
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1. Parse Σ as Σ = (ovk, c1, c2, Π, sig). If OVer(ovk; sig; c1, c2, Π) = 0, then
return 0.
2. Parse Π as Π = ((CMTi)
κ
i=1, (Ch1, . . . ,Chκ), (RSPi)
κ
i=1).
If (Ch1, · · · ,Chκ) 6= H1(M, (CMTi)κi=1, c1, c2, t), then return 0.
3. For i ∈ [κ], run the verification step of the underlying argument protocol
to check the validity of RSPi with respect to CMTi and Chi. If any of
the conditions does not hold, then return 0.
4. Return 1.
Open(gpk,mosk, t,M,Σ): If Verify(gpk, t,M,Σ) = 0, abort. Otherwise, let mosk
be S ∈ Zm×m and parse Σ as Σ = (ovk, c1, c2, Π, sig). Then it decrypts
(c1, c2) as follows:
1. Compute G = H0(ovk) = [g1| · · · |gℓ] ∈ Zn×ℓ. Then use S to compute
a small norm matrix Fovk ∈ Zm×ℓ such that B · Fovk = G mod q. This
is done by computing fi ← SampleD(B,S,gi, sℓ) for all i ∈ [ℓ] and let
Fovk = [f1| · · · |fℓ].
2. Use Fovk to decrypt (c1, c2) by computing
id′ =
⌊c2 − F⊤ovk · c1
⌊q/2⌋
⌉ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ.
3. Return id′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ.
3.2 Analysis of the Scheme
Efficiency. We first analyze the complexity of the scheme described in Sec-
tion 3.1, with respect to security parameter λ and parameters ℓ = logN and
d = logT . Recall k = ℓ + d.
– The group public key gpk has bit-size O˜(λ2 · k).
– The user secret key uskt[i] has at most d + 1 trapdoor matrices, and has
bit-size O˜(λ2 · k2d).
– The size of signature Σ is dominated by that of the Stern-like NIZKAoK Π ,
which is O˜(|ξ| · log q) ·ω(logλ), where |ξ| denotes the bit-size of the witness-
tuple ξ. Overall, Σ has bit-size O˜(λ · k).
Correctness. The correctness of the above scheme follows from the following
facts: (i) the underlying argument system is perfectly complete; (ii) the under-
lying encryption scheme obtained by transforming the IBE scheme in [25] via
CHK transformation [18] is correct.
Specifically, for an honest user, when he signs a message at time period t,
he is able to demonstrate the possession of a valid tuple ξ of the form (3).
Therefore, with probability 1, the resulting signature Π will be accepted by the
Verify algorithm, implied by the perfect completeness of the underlying argument
system. As for the correctness of the Open algorithm, note that
c2 − F⊤ovk · c1 = G⊤ · s+ e2 +
⌊q
2
⌋ · id− F⊤ovk · (B⊤ · s+ e1)
=
⌊q
2
⌋ · id + e2 − F⊤ovk · e1
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where ‖e1‖ ≤ B, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ B, and ‖fi‖∞ ≤ ⌈sℓ · logm⌉ = O˜(
√
n · k), which is
implied by Lemma 1. Recall that q = poly(n), m = O(n log q) and B = O˜(√n).
Hence
‖e2 − F⊤ovk · e1‖∞ ≤ B +m ·B · O˜(
√
n · k) = O˜(n2).
As long as we choose sufficiently large q, with probability 1, the Open algorithm
will recover id and correctness of the Open algorithm holds.
Security. In Theorem 2, we prove that our scheme satisfies the security re-
quirements put forward by Nakanishi et al. [51].
Theorem 2. In the random oracle model, the forward-secure group signature
described in Section 3.1 satisfies full anonymity and forward-secure traceability
requirements under the LWE and SIS assumptions.
The proof of the theorem is established by Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
Lemma 6. Suppose that one-time signature scheme OT S is strongly unforge-
able. In the random oracle model, the forward-secure group signature scheme
described in Section 3.1 is fully anonymous under the hardness of the LWEn,q,χ
problem.
Proof. Denote C as the challenger and A as the adversary. Following [45], we
prove this lemma using a series of computationally indistinguishable games. The
first game Game 0 is the real experiment ExpAnonFSGS,A(λ, T,N) while the last
game is such that the advantage of the adversary is 0.
Game 0: In this game, C runs the experiment ExpAnonFSGS,A(λ, T,N) faithfully.
In the challenge phase, A outputs a message M∗ together with two users
0 ≤ i0, i1 ≤ N − 1 for the targeted time t∗. C responds by sending back
a signature Σ∗ = (ovk∗, c∗1, c
∗
2, Π
∗, sig∗) ← Sign(gpk,uskt∗ [ib], t∗,M∗) for a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then the adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and this
game returns 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise. In this experiment, C replies with
all random strings for oracles queries of H0,H1.
Game 1: In this game, we modify Game 0 in two aspects: (i) We generate the
pair (ovk∗, osk∗) in the very beginning of the experiment; (ii) For the sig-
nature opening queries, if A asks for a valid signature of the form Σ =
(ovk, c1, c2, Π, sig) such that ovk = ovk
∗, then C outputs a random bit and
aborts the experiment. Now we argue that the probability that C aborts
is negligible and hence Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistin-
guishable. Actually, before the challenged signature is given to A, ovk∗ is
independent of A′s view, hence it is negligible that A queries a signature
containing ovk∗. Furthermore, after the challenged signature is sent to A,
if A queries a new valid signature of the form (ovk∗, c1, c2, Π, sig), then
((c1, c2, Π), sig) is a successful forgery of the OT S scheme, which breaks the
strong unforgeability of the OT S scheme. This proves that C aborts with
negligible probability. From now on, we assume that A will not query valid
signature containing ovk∗.
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Game 2: In this game, we change Game 1 in the following ways. First, in-
stead of generating B using the TrapGen algorithm, we generate a uniformly
random matrix B∗ over Zn×mq . This change is indistinguishable to A since
the matrix B is statistically close to uniform by Lemma 2. Second, we pro-
gram the random oracle H0 as follows. For query of ovk∗, it generates a
uniformly random matrix G∗ ∈ Zn×ℓq , let H0(ovk∗) = G∗, and return G∗ to
A. This change also makes no difference to A since the output of H0 is uni-
formly random. For query of ovk 6= ovk∗, we first sample Fovk ← Dm×ℓZ,sℓ , letH0(ovk) = G = B∗ ·Fovk mod q, and return G to A. We then keep a record
of (ovk,Fovk,G). G generated in this way is statistically close to uniform by
Lemma 1. Hence, this change does not affect A’s view non-negligibly. When
A queries the opening oracle a signature (ovk, c1, c2, Π, sig) with ovk 6= ovk∗,
C can use the recorded Fovk to decrypt the ciphertext (c, c2). Hence C can an-
swer all signature opening queries. It then follows that Game 2 and Game 1
are statistically indistinguishable.
Game 3: In this game,we modify Game 2 as follows. Instead of generating a
real proof Π∗ for the challenged signature, we generate a simulated one
without using the witness by programming the random oracle H1. Since our
argument system is statistically zero-knowledge, the view of adversary A is
statistically indistinguishable between Game 3 and Game 2.
Game 4: In this game, we change Game 3 as follows. Instead of computing
(c∗1, c
∗
2) = (B
∗⊤ · s+ e1, G∗⊤ · s+ e2 +
⌊q
2
⌋ · Bin(ib)) ∈ Zmq × Zℓq
in the challenged phase, where s ∈ χn, e1 ∈ χm, e2 ∈ χℓ, we let
(c∗1, c
∗
2) = (z
∗
1, z
∗
2 +
⌊q
2
⌋ · Bin(ib)),
where z∗1, z
∗
2 are uniformly random vectors over Z
m
q and Z
ℓ
q. We claim that
this modification is computationally indistinguishable to the view of the
adversary A assuming the hardness of LWEn,q,χ. Indeed, if we let D =
[B∗|G∗] ∈ Zn×(m+ℓ)q , e = (e1‖e2) ∈ χm+ℓ, and z = (z∗1‖z∗2) ∈ Zm+ℓq , then to
distinguish Game 3 and Game 4 is to distinguish (D,DT · s+ e) and (D, z).
Recall that B∗ and G∗ are uniformly random matrices, so is D.
Game 5: In this game, we slightly change Game 4 by substituting (c∗1, c
∗
2) with
a new independent and uniform tuple (z′1, z
′
2). It is straightforward that
Game 5 and Game 4 are statistically indistinguishable. Furthermore, the
challenged signature in this game does not depends on the challenged bit b
any more, and hence the advantage of A in this game is 0.
It then follows that AdvAnonFSGS,A(λ, T,N) is negligible in λ because of the
indistinguishability of the above games. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. In the random oracle model, the forward-secure group signature
scheme described in Section 3.1 is forward-secure traceable under the hardness
of the SIS∞n,m,q,2β problem, where m = (k + 1)m.
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Proof. Assume there is a PPT adversary A attacking the forward-secure trace-
ability of the forward-secure group signature scheme with non-negligible prob-
ability, then we construct a new PPT adversary B attacking the SIS∞n,m,q,2β
problem with non-negligible probability.
Given an SIS instance C ∈ Zn×mq , the goal of B is to find a non-zero vector
v ∈ Zmq such that C · v = 0 mod q and ‖v‖∞ ≤ 2β. Towards this goal, B
simulates the view of the adversary A attacking the forward-secure traceability.
Initially, B lets t = 0 and the set CU be empty and then generates group public
key gpk, secret key for opening mosk, and some secret internal state as follows:
– Parse C as C = [C0|C1| · · · |Ck] for Cj ∈ Zn×mq , j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}. It then
generates the remaining public parameters as in Section 3.1.
– Sample z = (z0‖z1‖ · · · ‖zk) ∈ Zm, where each zi is sampled from DZm,sk . If
‖z‖∞ > β, then repeat the sampling. Compute u = C · z mod q.
– Guess the targeted user i∗ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} and targeted forgery time
period t∗ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1} uniformly.
– Uncontrolled growth. Let id∗ = Bin(i∗) and z∗ = Bin(t∗). Define A
id∗[j]
j to
be Cj for j ∈ [ℓ] and Az
∗[j]
ℓ+j to be Cℓ+j for j ∈ [d]. Recall k = ℓ+ d.
– Controlled growth. Generate A
1−id∗[j]
j for all j ∈ [ℓ] via (A1−id
∗[j]
j ,Sj) ←
TrapGen(n,m, q) andA
1−z∗[j]
ℓ+j for j ∈ [d] via the algorithm (A1−z
∗[j]
ℓ+j ,Sℓ+j)←
TrapGen(n,m, q).
– Generate a master key pair (B,S) via TrapGen(n,m, q).
B invokes A by sending gpk,mosk and then interacts with A. At the start of
each time period t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1}, B announces the beginning of t to A. At
current time period t, B responds to A’s queries as follows.
– WhenA queries the random oraclesH0,H1, B replies with uniformly random
strings and keeps a record of the queries.
– When A queries the secret key of member i∗, if i∗ ∈ CU or t ≤ t∗, B
then aborts2. Otherwise, for each node z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1), it first computes
the smallest index dz,t such that 1 ≤ dz,t ≤ d and z∗[dz,t] 6= z[dz,t]. Then
B computes uskt[i][z] via SampleD(ExtBasis(Sℓ+dz,t ,Aid∗‖z), sk) if z is of
length d or via RandBasis(ExtBasis(Sℓ+dz,t ,Aid∗‖z), sℓ+dz) if z is of length
dz < d. Finally, B sets uskt[i] as in our construction and sends it to A. Add
i∗ to the set CU.
– When A queries the secret key of member i 6= i∗, if i ∈ CU, B then
aborts. Otherwise, let id = Bin(i) and ℓi be the smallest index such that
1 ≤ ℓi ≤ ℓ and id[ℓi] 6= id∗[ℓi]. Compute uskt[i][z] via the algorithm
SampleD(ExtBasis(Sℓi ,Aid‖z),u, sk) if z is of length d or via the algorithm
RandBasis(ExtBasis(Sℓi ,Aid‖z), sℓ+dz) if z is of length dz < d for z ∈ Nodes(t→T−1).
Set uskt[i] as in our construction and send it to A. Finally, add i to the set
CU.
2 This guarantees that once the secret key of member i∗ is queried, it is only queried
at time t such that t > t∗.
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– When A queries a signature on a message for user i. If i ∈ CU at current time
t, B aborts3. Otherwise, if i 6= i∗, B responds as in our algorithm Sign using
the corresponding witness. If i = i∗, B performs the same as in our algorithm
Sign except that it generates a simulated proof Π ′ by programming the hash
oracle H1 and returns Σ = (ovk, c1, c2, Π ′, sig) to A.
It is worth noticing that the secret key of user i∗ is either never queried (i∗ /∈ CU)
or is only queried at time t with t > t∗.
We claim that A cannot distinguish whether it interacts with the real chal-
lenger or with B. First, group public key gpk given to A is indistinguishable from
the real one. This is because the output matrix A of the TrapGen algorithm is
statistically close to uniform by Lemma 2 and u is statistically close to a uni-
form vector over Znq by Lemma 1. Second, the secret signing key given to A is
indistinguishable from the real one due to the fact that the outputs of RandBasis
using two different bases are within negligible statistical distance by Lemma 5.
Third, the signature queries make no difference to the view of A. This can be
implied by the statistical zero-knowledge property of the underlying argument
system.
When A halts and outputs a messageM∗ and a signature Σ∗ at the targeted
time period t′ such that Verify(gpk, t′,M∗, Σ∗) = 1 and Π∗ is not obtained by
making a signing query at M∗, check t′ = t∗ holds or not. If not, indicating the
guess of t∗ fails, then B aborts. Otherwise, A outputs (t∗,M∗, Σ∗). Parse Σ∗ as
(ovk∗, c∗1, c
∗
2, (CMT
∗
i )
κ
i=1, (Ch
∗
i )
κ
i=1, (RSP
∗
i )
κ
i=1, sig
∗).
Run id′ ← Open(gpk,mosk, t∗,M∗, Σ∗). If id′ 6= id∗, indicating that the guess of
i∗ fails, then B aborts. Otherwise, B makes use of the forgery to solve the SIS
problem as follows.
First, Amust have queriedH1 for the tuple (M∗, (CMT∗i )κi=1, c∗1, c∗2, t∗), since
the probability of guessing this value is at most 3−κ, which is negligible by our
choice of κ. Let (M∗, (CMT∗i )
κ
i=1, c
∗
1, c
∗
2, t
∗) be the h-th oracle query and QH1 be
the total oracle queries A has made to H1. Next, B lets h be the targeted forking
point and replays A polynomial-number times. For each new run, B starts with
the same random tape and random input as in the original run. Further, for
the first h − 1 queries of H1, B replies with the same random value as in the
original run, but from h-th query on, B replies with fresh and independent value.
Besides, for queries of H0, B always replies as in the original run.
Constructed in this way, (M∗, (CMT∗i )
κ
i=1, c
∗
1, c
∗
2, t
∗) is always the h-th ora-
cle query A made to H1. The improved forking lemma [15] implies that with
probability ≥ 12 , B obtains 3-fork for the tuple (M∗, (CMT∗i )κi=1, c∗1, c∗2, t∗) with
pairwise distinct hash values CH
(1)
h , CH
(2)
h , CH
(3)
h and corresponding valid re-
sponses RSP
(1)
h , RSP
(2)
h , RSP
(3)
h . A simple calculation shows that with proba-
bility 1 − (79 )κ, we have {CH
(1)
h,j , CH
(2)
h,j, CH
(3)
h,j} = {1, 2, 3} for some j ∈ [κ].
Therefore, RSP
(1)
h,j , RSP
(2)
h,j, RSP
(3)
h,j are 3 valid responses for all the challenges
3 Note that B never answers the signing queries of corrupted users.
20
1, 2, 3 w.r.t. the same commitment CMT∗j . Since COM is computationally bind-
ing, B is able to extract the witness tuple
ξ∗ = (id, s, e1, e2,vid‖z)
such that ‖vid‖z‖∞ ≤ β, ‖s‖∞ ≤ B, ‖e1‖∞ ≤ B, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ B and
Aid‖z · vid‖z = u mod q,
(c∗1 = B
T · s+ e1, c∗2 = (G∗)T · s+ e2 +
⌊
q
2
⌋ · id) ∈ Zmq × Zℓq,
whereG∗ = H0(ovk∗). Conditioned on guessing correctly i∗, t∗, we have id = id∗
and z = z∗. Therefore,Aid‖z = C. Now we haveC·vid‖z = u = C·z mod q. We
claim that vid‖z 6= z with overwhelming probability. This is because A either
queried the secret key of user id at time after t∗ or never queried the secret
key at all (by successfully attacking forward-secure traceability), then z is not
known to A. Further, from the view of the adversary, z is from the distribution
DΛu(C),sk and hence has large min-entropy, which are implied by Lemma 1.
Therefore, vid‖z 6= z with overwhelming probability. Hence x = vid‖z − z 6= 0
and ‖x‖∞ ≤ 2β. This implies that we solve the SIS∞n,m,q,2β problem with non-
negligible probability and hence our scheme is forward-secure traceable.
4 The Underlying Zero-Knowledge Argument System
In Section 4.1, we recall the extension, decomposition, and permutation tech-
niques from [44,33]. Then we describe in Section 4.2 our statistical ZKAoK pro-
tocol that will be used in generating group signatures.
4.1 Extension, Decomposition, and Permutation
Extensions. For m ∈ Z, let B3m be the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3m having
exactly m coordinates −1, m coordinates 1, and m coordinates 0 and Sm be the
set of all permutations on m elements. Let ⊕ be the addition operation modulo 2.
Define the following functions
– ext3: {−1, 0, 1}m → B3m that transforms a vector v = (v1, . . . , vm)⊤ to vector
(v‖(−1)m−n−1‖0m−n0‖1m−n1)⊤, where nj is the number of element j in the
vector v for j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
– enc2: {0, 1}m → {0, 1}2m that transforms a vector v = (v1, . . . , vm)⊤ to
vector (v1, 1− v1, . . . , vm, 1− vm)⊤.
Decompositions and Permutations. We now recall the integer decompo-
sition technique. For any B ∈ Z+, define pB = ⌊logB⌋ + 1 and the sequence
B1, . . . , BpB as Bj = ⌊B+2
j−1
2j ⌋ for each j ∈ [pB]. As observed in [44], it satis-
fies
∑pB
j=1 Bj = B and any integer v ∈ [B] can be decomposed to idecB(v) =
(v(1), . . . , v(pB))⊤ ∈ {0, 1}pB such that ∑pBj=1 Bj · v(j) = v. This decomposition
procedure is described in a deterministic manner as follows:
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1. v′ := v
2. For j = 1 to pB do:
(i) If v′ ≥ Bj then v(j) := 1, else v(j) := 0;
(ii) v′ := v′ −Bj · v(j).
3. Output idecB(v) = (v
(1), . . . , v(pB))⊤.
Next, for any positive integers m, B, we define the function vdecm,B that trans-
forms a vector w = (w1, . . . , wm)
⊤ ∈ [−B,B]m to a vector of the following form:
w′ = (σ(w1) · idecB(|w1|)‖ · · · ‖σ(wm) · idecB(|wm|)) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mpB ,
where ∀j ∈ [m]: σ(wj) = 0 if wj = 0; σ(wj) = −1 if wj < 0; σ(wj) = 1 if wj > 0.
Define the matrix Hm,B =
B1, . . . , BpB . . .
B1, . . . , BpB
 ∈ Zm×mpB and
its extension Ĥm,B = [Hm,B|0m×2mpB ] ∈ Zm×3mpB . Let ŵ = ext3(w′) ∈ B3mpB ,
then one can see that Ĥm,B · ŵ = w and for any ψ ∈ S3mpB , the following
equivalence holds:
ŵ ∈ B3mpB ⇔ ψ(ŵ) ∈ B3mpB . (4)
Define the following permutation.
– For any e = (e1, . . . , em)
⊤ ∈ {0, 1}m, define Πe : Z2m → Z2m that maps a
vector v = (v01 , v
1
1 , . . . , v
0
m
, v1
m
)⊤ to (ve11 , v
1−e1
1 , . . . , v
em
m
, v1−em
m
)⊤.
One can see that, for any z, e ∈ {0, 1}m, the following equivalence holds:
v = enc2(z)⇔ Πe(v) = enc2(z ⊕ e). (5)
4.2 The Underlying Zero-Knowledge Argument System
We now describe a statistical ZKAoK that will be invoked by the signer when gen-
erating group signatures. The protocol is developed from Stern-like techniques
proposed by Ling et al. [44] and Langlois et al. [33].
Public input γ: A0 ∈ Zn×mq , Abj ∈ Zn×mq for (b, j) ∈ {0, 1} × [k], u ∈ Znq ,
B ∈ Zn×mq , G ∈ Zn×ℓq , (c1, c2) ∈ Zmq × Zℓq, t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1}.
Secret input ξ: id ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, s ∈ χn, e1 ∈ χm, e2 ∈ χℓ, vid‖z ∈ Z(ℓ+d+1)m
with z = Bin(t).
Prover’s goal:
Aid‖z · vid‖z = u mod q, ‖vid‖z‖∞ ≤ β;
c1 = B
⊤ · s+ e1 mod q, c2 =G⊤ · s+ e2 +
⌊
q
2
⌋ · id mod q;
‖s‖∞ ≤ B, ‖e1‖∞ ≤ B, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ B.
(6)
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We first rearrange the above conditions. Let A′ = [A|A01|A11| · · · |A0ℓ |A1ℓ ] ∈
Z
(2ℓ+1)m
q , Aid = [A0|Aid[1]1 | · · · |Aid[ℓ]1 ] ∈ Z(ℓ+1)mq and A′′ = Az[1]ℓ+1| · · · |Az[d]ℓ+1] ∈
Z
dm
q . Then Aid‖z = [Aid|A′′] ∈ Z(ℓ+d+1)mq . Let vid = (v0‖v1‖ · · · ‖vℓ), w2 =
(vℓ+1‖ · · · ‖vℓ+d) with each vi ∈ Zm. Then vid‖z = (vid‖w2). Therefore Aid‖z ·
vid‖z = u mod q is equivalent to
Aid · vid +A′′ ·w2 = u mod q. (7)
Since id is part of secret input, Aid should not be explicitly given. We note
that Langlois et al. [33] already addressed this problem. The idea is as follows:
they first added ℓ suitable zero-blocks of size m to vector vid and then obtained
the extended vector w1 = (v0‖v01‖v11‖ · · · ‖v0ℓ‖v1ℓ ) ∈ Z(2ℓ+1)m, where the added
zero-blocks are v
1−id[1]
1 , . . . ,v
1−id[ℓ]
ℓ and v
id[i]
i = vi, ∀i ∈ [ℓ]. Now one can check
that equation (7) is equivalent to
A′ ·w1 +A′′ ·w2 = u mod q. (8)
Let B′ =
[
B⊤ Im 0
m×ℓ
G⊤ 0ℓ×m Iℓ
]
, B′′ =
[
0m×ℓ
⌊q/2⌋Iℓ
]
, and w3 = (s‖e1‖e2) ∈
Z
n+m+ℓ. Then one can check that c1 = B
⊤ · s + e1 mod q, c2 = G⊤ · s +
e2 +
⌊
q
2
⌋ · id mod q is equivalent to
B′ ·w3 +B′′ · id = (c1‖c2) mod q. (9)
Using basic algebra, we can transform equations (8)and (9) into one equation of
the following form:
M0 ·w0 = u0 mod q,
where M0, u0 are built from A
′,A′′,B′,B′′ and u, (c1‖c2), respectively, and
w0 = (w1‖w2‖w3‖id).
Now we can use the decomposition and extension techniques described in
Section 4.1 to handle our secret vectors. Let L1 = 3(2ℓ + 1)mpβ, L2 = 3dmpβ,
L3 = 3(n+m+ ℓ)pB, and L = L1+L2+L3+2ℓ. We transform our secret vector
w0 to vector w = (ŵ1‖ŵ2‖ŵ3‖îd) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L of the following form:
– ŵ1 = (v̂0‖v̂01‖v̂11‖ · · · ‖v̂0ℓ‖v̂1ℓ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L1 with v̂0 = ext3(vdecm,β(v0)) ∈
B3mpβ , ∀i ∈ [ℓ], v̂1−id[i]i = 03mpβ and v̂id[i]i = ext3(vdecm,β(vid[i]i )) ∈ B3mpβ ;
– ŵ2 = ext3(vdecdm,β(w2)) ∈ B3dmpβ ;
– ŵ3 = ext3(vdecn+m+ℓ,B(w3)) ∈ B3(n+m+ℓ)pB ;
– îd = enc2(id) ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ.
Using basic algebra, we can form public matrix M such that
M ·w =M0 ·w0 = u0 mod q.
Up to this point, we have transformed the considered relations into equation
of the desired form M · w = u mod q. We now specify the set VALID that
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contains the secret vector w, the set S and permutations {Γφ : φ ∈ S} such that
the conditions in (1) hold.
Define VALID to be the set of vectors of the form z = (z1‖z2‖z3‖z4) ∈
{−1, 0, 1}L such that there exists x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
– z1 = (y0‖y01‖y11‖ · · · ‖y0ℓ‖y1ℓ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}3(2ℓ+1)mpβ with y0 ∈ B3mpβ and for
each i ∈ [ℓ], y1−x[i]i = 03mpβ , yx[i]i ∈ B3mpβ ;
– z2 ∈ B3dmpβ and z3 ∈ B3(n+m+ℓ)pB ;
– z4 = enc2(x) ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ.
Clearly, our vector w belongs to the tailored set VALID.
Now, let S = (S3mpβ )2ℓ+1 × S3dmpβ × S3(n+m+ℓ)pB × {0, 1}ℓ. For any
φ = (ψ0, ψ
0
1 , ψ
1
1 , . . . , ψ
0
ℓ , ψ
1
ℓ , η2, η3, e) ∈ S, e = (e1, . . . , eℓ)⊤,
define the permutation Γφ : Z
L → ZL as follows. When applied to a vector
z = (y0‖y01‖y11‖ · · · ‖y0ℓ‖y1ℓ‖z2‖z3‖z4) ∈ ZL
where the first 2ℓ + 1 blocks are of size 3mpβ and the last three blocks are of
size 3dmpβ, 3(n+m+ ℓ)pB and 2ℓ, respectively; it transforms z to vector Γφ(z)
of the following form:
(ψ(y0)‖ψe11 (ye11 )‖ψ1−e11 (y1−e11 )‖ · · · ‖ψeℓℓ (yeℓℓ )‖ψ1−eℓℓ (y1−eℓℓ )‖
η2(z2)‖η3(z3)‖Πe(z4) ).
Based on the equivalences observed in (4) and (5) , it can be checked that if
z ∈ VALID for some x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, then Γφ(z) ∈ VALID for some x⊕e ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. In
other words, the conditions in (1) hold, and therefore, we can obtain the desired
statistical ZKAoK protocol.
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A Some Remarks on [28] (ePrint 2017/1128)
In [28], Kansal, Dutta, and Mukhopadhyay proposed a forward-secure group sig-
nature scheme from lattices in the model of Libert and Yung [43]. Unfortunately,
it can be observed that their proposed scheme does not satisfy the correctness
and security requirements.
The version of the scheme posted on 27-Nov-2017 15:26:21 UTC contains the
following shortcomings.
– The scheme does not satisfy the correctness requirement. The opening al-
gorithm, on input a signature generated by user i, does not output i. In
fact, the transcript for user i stored by the group manager is transcripti =
(v
(0)
i , i, uvk[i], sigi, [t1, t2]). However, when signing messages at time t1 + j
with 0 < j ≤ t2 − t1, the user i encrypts v(j)i , which is never seen by the
group manager and which is unrelated to v
(0)
i . Hence, the decryption proce-
dure can only recovers v
(j)
i and no user is being traced in this case. (Readers
are referred to Page 22 (Join algorithm) and Page 25 (Sign algorithm) in [28]
for more details.)
– The scheme does not satisfy the anonymity requirement. The signature gen-
erated by user i at time period tj contains matrix C
(j)
i , which is part of the
updated certificate and which should be kept secret. Therefore, two signa-
tures generated by the same user at the same period can easily be linked.
(Readers are referred to Page 24 (Update algorithm) and Page 27 (equation
(13)) in [28] for more details.)
We note that in an updated version of the scheme, posted on 18-Jan-2018
17:33:37 UTC, the signature does not contain matrixC
(j)
i , but the validity of the
signature now cannot be publicly verified. That is because, in order to verify the
underlying zero-knowledge argument system of Section 5 (Page 27), one needs
to be given matrix C
(j)
idi
that encodes the secret identity of the signer and that
is not publicly known. In other words, this updated scheme also does not work.
We further observe that, a version of the scheme posted on 19-Apr-2018
07:26:41 UTC still contains the following shortcoming.
– The signatures generated by malicious users cannot be properly identified.
In fact, to tackle with the first problem we have put forwarded above, the
authors allow all users to update their transcripts to contain v
(j)
i at time tj .
However, this enables all malicious user to update the transcript arbitrarily.
Therefore, employing the transcript to identify the signer when opening sig-
natures is meaningless. (Readers are referred to the updating algorithm in
Page 25.)
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